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DRUG LYRICS, THE FCC AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
L INTRODUCTION
In the late 1950's, a nimble-fingered black guitarslinger from Chicago
sold nearly a million copies of a phonograph record which taunted:
"Roll Over Beethoven, dig these rhythm and blues."1  Chuck Berry
was acknowledging an explosive two or three year-old musical form
which popularly became known as "rock and roll". During the last
two decades, this billion dollar-a-year phenomenon2 has generated a
staggering impact on youth. Essentially iconoclastic3 in its embryonic
years and consistently identified with rebellious attitudes towards sex
4
and other moral issues, this "profoundly subversive'"5 music was
adopted as the "sounds of the American cultural revolution."6
Opposition was inevitable. Negative reactions ranged from the
apathetic disgust of some critics7 to vigorous condemnation by civic
1. "Roll Over Beethoven" by Chuck Berry, copyright 1956, Are Music Corp.
2. In the early 1920's, the record business was enjoying a 100 million dollar-a-year
sales profit, but the economic depression at the close of that decade reduced the amount
by more than ninety percent. In 1933 the figure was a dismal six million dollars, but
by the 1940's it had multiplied seven-fold in a resurgence effected by the success of
the "big bands". Sales exceeded 200 million at mid-point in the 1950's, and the
rock and roll boom tripled the figure in four years. C. GmLETT, THun SouND oF
Tni Crry 3, 48 (1970) [hereinafter cited as GILLETT]. In 1966, the industry grossed
almost 900 million dollars. Peyser, The Music of Sound or, the Beatles and the Beat-
less, in THE AGE OF RocK 130 (J. Eisen ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as AGE OF RocK].
Today, the annual sum exceeds the one billion dollar mark. AGE oF RocK xiii (1969).
3. See Newman, I Used to Think I Was Really Ugly, in AGE OF ROCK, supra note
2, at 104:
When a pop audience blows its top it is, in fact, indulging in a communal act of
defiance against a set of values which it feels to be unnecessarily and intolerably
restrictive. It is a group protest against a society which it regards as impersonal,
mechanistic and money-bound.
See generally Mooney, Popular Music Since the 1920's: The Significance of Shifting
Taste, in AGE OF ROCK, supra note 2, at 25-29.
4. Since its inception, rock music has been a communicative vehicle through which
various attitudes toward sex have been expressed. See generally N. CoHN, RocK
FRom THnE BEGINNING 4-5, 12-15, 107, 135 (1970); P. WrrLiAMs, OUTLAw BLUES
93-99 (1969).
5. AGE OF Rocr, supra note 2, at xv.
6. Id. See also GmLETT, supra note 2, at 18.
7. See, e.g., GiLLETF, supra note 2, at 21, wherein the author notes syndicated critic
John Crosby's terse denouncement of Elvis Presley as an "unspeakably untalented and
vulgar young entertainer."
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officials8 and clergymen.9  The self-imposed censorship of record
companies extended to the liner notes printed on album jackets."0 The
more repressive measures included the banning of songs from radio
and television airwaves," the burning of undesirable records,' 2 and
the prohibition of concerts.'
The rock culture's retaliation to this censorial repression was an
adroit counterattack. Critic A. G. Aronowitz observed:
While American radio kept busy trying to keep its turntable clean of
records that dealt with sex and drugs, American songwriters kept busy
outwitting the censors with lyrics that had double, triple and some-
times multiple meanings.' 4
Of the myriad social developments which unraveled contempo-
raneously with the growth of rock and roll, probably the most disturb-
ing has been the recent deluge of illegal narcotics upon the schools
and homes in all regions of the country.' 5  The current Administration
estimates that it directs roughly twice the amount of funds toward nar-
cotics control as did its predecessor.' 6 Notable governmental officials
postulate that the simultaneous dissemination of drugs and rock music
is evidence of a cause-and-effect correlation.' 7  Some song lyrics are
8. See, e.g., Peyser, The Music of Sound or, the Beatles and the Beatless, in AOE OF
Rocu, supra note 2, at 127, wherein the author notes that Beatle John Lennon's assess-
ment of religious hypocrisy ("We're more popular than Jesus now") caused mayors
across the nation to ban Beatle concerts in their cities.
9. See, e.g., Gr.LErr, supra note 2, at 21, noting that rock and roll was viewed by
some southern churchmen as a plot devised by the NAACP to corrupt white southern
youth.
10. When singer Frank Zappa desired to print controversial lyrics on the album
liner of one of his MGM records, the company's legal department ruled against it.
Kofsky, Frank Zappa Interview, in AGE OF RocK, supra note 2, at 260-61.
11. GiLLET, supra note 2, at 22. In 1966, England's Rolling Stones released a
single entitled "Let's Spend the Night Together" by Mick Jagger & Keith Richards,
copyright 1966, Gideon Music, Inc. Most American stations responded initially by
broadcasting only the less controversial flip side--"Ruby Tuesday". Ed Sullivan, prior
to a performance of "Let's Spend the Night Together" on his Sunday evening television
show, insisted that the title lyric be mumbled. Aronowitz, A Family Album, in AGE
OF ROcK, supra note 2, at 195.
12. C. BELZ, THE STORY OF RocK 56 (1969).
13. See N. CoHN, Rocu FROM THE BEGIN NG 14 (1970); note 8 supra.
14. Aronowitz, A Family Album, in AGE OF RoCm, supra note 2, at 195.
15. See THE PRESMENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINSTiAnON OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: NARcoTIcs AND DRUG ABUSE (1967); Lang, The Presi.
dent's Crime Commission Task Force Report on Narcotics and Drug Abuse: A
Critique of The Apologia, 43 NOTRE DAME LAw. 847 (1968).
16. Address by Vice-President Agnew, Nevada Republican Dinner, Las Vegas, Ne-
vada, Sept. 14, 1970.
17. Id. The Vice-President claims that "in too many of the lyrics, the message of
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alleged to "promote or glorify the use of illegal drugs.'* 8  Consequent-
ly, on March 5, 1971, the Federal Communications Commission, pur-
suant to the authority granted under the Communications Act of 193419
to regulate broadcasting in the public interest,20 distributed Public
Notice 71-205 to all radio broadcast licensees.2' In an attempt to
discourage or eliminate the airing of "drug lyrics", Notice 71-205 pro-
vides that a licensee must interpret the meaning of the verbal content
of all songs prior to their broadcast and determine "[w]hether a particu-
lar record depicts the dangers of drug abuse, or, to the contrary, pro-
motes such illegal drug usage... "22 Since the administrative standard
of "public interest" is cited throughout the document, the radio industry
could only conclude that a lack of cooperation would inevitably place
various stations' broadcast licenses in danger of revocation or non-renew-
al.
the drug culture is purveyed. We should listen more carefully to popular music, be-
cause. . . at its worst it is blatant drug-culture propaganda."
18. Public Notice 71-205 re Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their
Broadcast, 28 F.C.C.2d 409 (1971) [see note 21 infra].
19. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 301, 48 Stat. 1081, as amended, 47
U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1970).
20. Id. § 303.
21. Public Notice 71-205 re Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their
Broadcast, 28 F.C.C.2d 409-10 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Notice 71-205]:
A number of complaints received by the Commission concerning the lyrics of
records played on broadcasting stations relate to a subject of current and pressing
concern: the use of language tending to promote or glorify the use of illegal drugs
such as marijuana, LSD, "speed", etc. This Notice points up the licensee's long-
established responsibilities in this area.
Whether a particular record depicts the dangers of drug abuse, or, to the con-
trary, promotes such illegal drug usage is a question for the judgment of the li-
censee. The thrust of this Notice is simply that the licensee must make that judg-
ment and cannot properly follow a policy of playing such records without some-
one in a responsible position (i.e., a management level executive at the station)
knowing the content of the lyrics. Such a pattern of operation is clearly a viola-
tion of the basic principle of the licensee's responsibility for, and duty to exercise
adequate control over, the broadcast material presented over his station. It raises
serious questions as to whether continued operation of the station is in the public
interest, just as in the case of a failure to exercise adequate control over foreign-
language programs.
In short, we expect broadcast licensees to ascertain, before broadcast, the words
or lyrics of recorded musical or spoken selections played on their stations. Just
as in the case of foreign-language broadcasts, this may also entail reasonable ef-
forts to ascertain the meaning of words or phrases used in the lyrics. While this
duty may be delegated by licensees to responsible employees, the licensee remains
fully responsible for its fulfillment.
Thus, here as in so many other areas, it is a question of responsible, good faith
action by the public trustee to whom the frequency has been licensed. No more,
but certainly no less, is called for. [Issued by the Commission-Commissioners
Burch (Chairman), Well, and Robert E. Lee, with Commissioner Lee issuing a
separate statement Id. at 410. Commissioners H. Rex Lee and Houser concurred
and issued separate statements. Id. at 410-11. Commissioner Johnson dissented and
issued a separate statement. Id. at 412-17.1
22. Id.
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The purpose of this Comment is to explore the binding effect which
Notice 71-205 has had upon the broadcasting industry. Applicable
First Amendment principles will be set forth and discussed and it will
be shown that several of these principles operate to invalidate the Notice
as an excessive and overbroad restraint on speech.
11. THE FCC AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The First Amendment provides in part that: "Congress shall make
no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... .
This guarantee has been held to apply to print,2 4 films, 28 broadcasting20
and other media.27 Though the concept of free speech is not without
bounds,28 one approach ostensibly infers the contrary. This is the
23. U.S. CONST. amend. L
24. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Overseas Media Corp. v. McNa-
mara, 259 F. Supp. 162, 163 (D.D.C. 1966), overruled on other grounds, 385 F.2d 308
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
25. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952).
26. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969); U.S. v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948); Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v.
FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 476 (2d Cir. 1971); see American Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 110 F. Supp. 374, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), af!'d, 347 U.S. 284 (1954); Note,
The Public Domain and A Right of Access: Affect Upon the Broadcast Media, 3 Loy.
L.A. L. Rnv. 451 (1970).
27. See Superior Films v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (con-
curring opinion), wherein Justice Douglas noted that "the First Amendment draws no
distinction between the various methods of communicating ideas." This is not to say,
however, that differences in media are not without constitutional significance. The
manner in which expression is disseminated to listeners or viewers may prove to be a
determinative factor in adjudicating First Amendment issues. See Kalven, Broadcast.
ing, Public Policy And the First Amendment, 10 J. LAw & EcoN. 15, 33-35 (1967); text
accompanying notes 65-80 infra. Other forms of communication to which the First
Amendment has been adjudged to apply include personal letters and other correspond-
ence (Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970)); the right to receive
information and ideas (American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Inc. v. Radford
College, 315 F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Va. 1970)); and live theatre productions (P.B.I.C.,
Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mass. 1970)).
28. The concept that First Amendment freedoms must be subjected to broad public
objectives such as general order and safety is well established. However, such subordi-
nation may occur only under narrowly drawn administrative procedures. See Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (only a mate-
rial and substantial disruption of discipline would justify restraint upon expression of
ideas by students); United States v. Vigil, 431 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970) and Aber-
nathy v. Conroy, 429 F.2d 1170, 1176 (4th Cir. 1970) (violence is not accorded First
Amendment protection, even though it constitutes symbolic or expressive conduct);
Sill v. Penn State Univ., 318 F. Supp. 608, 615-16 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (students
may express their opinions so long as speech or conduct does not create a serious dis-
ruption of school discipline; the First Amendment does not require that persons may
speak at any time, at any place, in any manner they choose); Eisner v. Stamford Bd.
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absolutist position, 29 often ascribed to Justice Black 0 but never widely
implemented by the Supreme Court. While absolutism entails an a
priori assertion of constitutional sanctuary, such protection neverthe-
less may be qualified or denied to certain categories of expression such
as public obscenity, 31 libel,32 and threatening or "fighting expressions".
83
However, attempts to establish precise classes of speech to which a
formula may be mechanically administered have been overshadowed
by a stubborn conviction that only a case-by-case treatment will main-
tain these liberties in a true perspective. Since the circumstances sur-
rounding a particular statement may be such that speech is denied
constitutional safeguards which would otherwise have been afforded
had those circumstances been different, the expression is usually judged
within the context of the specific factual situation.3 4 There are sev-
of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 832, 835 (D. Conn. 1970) (in the face of reasonable regula-
tions specifically shown to be constitutionally valid, intrusions upon free speech are
permissible).
29. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITCAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE (1960); A. MEiKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN-
MENT 17, 67-77 (1948); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Su-
PREME Cr. REv. 245, 256.
30. See Cahn, Justice Black and The First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public
Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 549 (1962); McBride, Mr. Justice Black And His Quali-
fied Absolutes, 2 Loy. L.A. L. Ruv. 37 (1969).
31. See United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402,U.S. 363, 373-74 (1971)
(statute providing for pre-hearing seizure of obscene material upheld upon construction
that it requires judicial administrative action within specified time limits; Congress has
power within Constitution to remove obscenity from channels of commerce); Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (while public distribution of obscenity is not
within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech or press, mere private possession
of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press).
32. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). Defamatory speech is protected,
however, when it is directed against public figures or persons who are engaged in news-
worthy conduct, unless it can be shown that the statement was actually false and that
it was published with actual knowledge of the falsity or with reckless disregard of
whether or not it was false. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971);
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALuI. L. Ruv.
935 (1968).
33. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (upholding federal legislation mak-
ing criminal a true threat, uttered knowingly and willingly, of physical violence to the
President); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (derisive "fighting"
words in public can be forbidden by statute); cf. Gooding v. Wilson, 40 U.S.L.W. 4329
(U.S. March 21, 1972) (state statute held unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in
that it had not been narrowed by state courts to apply only to fighting words).
34. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Schenck v. United States,
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eral theories concerning the criteria under which a set of facts could
constitute sufficient grounds for dissociating the speech from the
sweeping ambit of the First Amendment's shelter,35 and where the
issue is "speech plus conduct" instead of "pure speech," the activity
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The constitutional significance of the factual context
in which statements are made is particularly crucial where the statements are ac-
companied by acts. Cf. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (invali-
dating a criminal conviction following an orderly civil rights demonstration); Brown
v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (criminal conviction invalidated follow-
ing a peaceful attempt by Blacks to use segregated facilities); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1963) (same); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303-04, 306-08 (1940) (same-religious conviction).
35. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959) (balancing test);
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) and Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (preferred position test); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (clear and present danger test).
Justice Holmes' clear and present danger test is among the oldest of theories address-
ing the significance of the circumstances in which the speech occurs:
[Tlhe character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
• . . The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such cir-
cumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. Id.
This standard was later delineated as turning upon the imminency of the danger.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.'357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., con-
curring), Justice Brandeis concluded that "[ojnly an emergency can justify repres-
sion [of speech]." More recently, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the
Court considered the protections encircling the advocacy of illegal conduct and deter-
mined that such rights of advocacy would be suspended only "where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action." Id. at 447. The clear and present danger test is still employed
in its original phraseology (see, e.g., Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333, 338 (6th Cir.
1970)), and is widely employed to determine the constitutional status of incendiary
statements. See, e.g., Ascheim v. Quinlan, 314 F. Supp. 685, 689 (W.D. Pa. 1970)
(First Amendment does not apply to violent conduct or to incitement to such action);
People v. Winston, 64 Misc. 2d 150, 314 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1970) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of a statute which forbids incitement to riot).
The preferred position approach requires that any legislation infringing upon the First
Amendment liberties must be overwhelmingly justifiable rather than merely supportable
of some legitimate public objective. Formulation of the concept is often credited to
Justice Stone's opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938); A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PiLLAR OF THE LAW 512-16 (1956). The
term "preferred position" was first used by the Court in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 115 (1943), adopting the phrase as it was employed in Justice Stone's dissent
in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942).
The balancing approach is essentially a rationalization for allowing legislative enact-
ments to rest undisturbed. By this approach the Court weighs the interests of the
individual and the government and, in the balancing, if the interest of the state is
compelling "the balance . . . must be struck in favor of the latter. . . ." Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959). See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
95-96, 105-06 (1940) (applying the balancing test in striking down an anti-picketing
statute-no compelling state interest).
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has been held subject to regulation as to the "time, place, and manner" of
the demonstration. 6
A. FCC Regulation in the Public Interest
While the First Amendment expressly constrains the exertion of
power by Congress, its mandate has been extended to the states r and,
of particular interest here, to the Federal Communications Commis-
sion.38 The inevitability of some governmental control of speech com-
municated through the medium of radio emanates from the fact that
there exist more license applicants than available frequencies.3 9 Never-
theless, licensees enjoy the full panoply of liberties guaranteed by the
First Amendment.40 The reconciliation of these polar considerations
is a task which, despite official policy statements and court interpre-
tations, remains unresolved.
36. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (trespass statute not overly
broad as to trespassers who refused to leave upon request); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965) (statute prohibiting parades and meetings unconstitutional because not
narrowly limited to time, place and manner); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569 (1941), (license tax sustained where license narrowly construed so that it could
only be refused for considerations of time, place and manner); cf. Fortune v. Molpus,
431 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1970).
Notice 71-205 focuses upon the freedom of expression through broadcasting, which
is an activity of pure speech since it entails none of the conduct-e.g., traffic disrup-
tion or public disturbance-which characterized the "time, place and manner" decisions.
37. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 386-87 (1927) (state statute which inhibits speech
is violative of due process); see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Frank-
furter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights Into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 746 (1965).
38. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-95 (1969); Banzhaf v.
FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1099-1103 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see Robinson, The FCC and the
First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52
MINN. L. REv. 67 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Robinson].
The First Amendment is also applicable to the broadcasters themselves, insofar as
their actions tend to unreasonably stifle the full and free expression of views of the
public. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3415 (U.S. Feb. 29, 1972) (No. 864). See text
accompanying notes 48-86 infra.
39. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969); National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943); Mt. Mansfield Television,
Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 1971).
40. See United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 134, 166 (1948). Li-
censees may be somewhat restricted, however, by the very nature of program dissemi-
nation. See text accompanying notes 52-67 infra. Cf. Business Executives' Move for
Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted):
It has always been clear that the broadcast media. . . are affected by strong First
Amendment interests. Yet the nature of those interests has not been so clear; an
evolution of constitutional principles in this area is still very much in progress.
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The FCC derives its authority from the Communications Act of
1934,41 and the extent of its control over program content is delineated
by both statute and case law.41 "Public interest" is the administra-
tive guideline under which all FCC programming control is exercised.43
On its face, "public interest" is an indefinite yardstick and the courts
have had little success in defining its boundaries. At the very least,
however, it has been interpreted to require that the Commission must
not perform arbitrarily or capriciously or operate beyond constitu-
tional and statutory bounds. 44
41. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 301, 48 Stat. 1081, as amended, 47
U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1970).
42. Statutory language makes criminal any broadcasting which: (1) imparts gam-
bling information, 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1970); (2) perpetrates fraud, id. § 1343; (3) airs
obscene language, id. § 1464; or encourages or furthers a riot, id. § 2101.
The Communications Act vests extensive sanctioning power in the FCC when a
violation of sections 1304, 1343 or 1464 of Title 18 has occurred. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312
(a)(6), (b)(6), 503(b)(1)(E) (1970). Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250,
255-58, 23 P & F RADIO REG. 483, 485e-85h (1962), ajfd sub nom. Robinson v. FCC,
334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
43. The standard is employed in granting the original broadcast license, 47 U.S.C.
§ 307(a) (1970); in renewing such license, id. § 307(d); and in transferring station
control to a new licensee, id. § 310(b).
44. McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957). The Supreme Court broadly observed that public interest
is "the interest of the listening public in 'the larger and more effective use of radio.'"
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943), quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 303(g) (1970).
The FCC has supplementally attempted to clarify the meaning of public interest.
In 1946, the FCC issued the Blue Book, a document summarizing four "program
service factors." FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSmLITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES 55
(1946). In issuing and renewing licenses, the FCC proposed to consider: (1) the ap-
plicant's maintenance of a balanced format, (2) whether the licensee proferred a local
live program, (3) whether the licensee aired public matters and current events dis-
cussions, and (4) lack of advertising excess.
A more explicit catalogue of broadcasting criteria was established in 1960, when the
Commission designated fourteen program categories considered necessary to ensure a
"balanced" general scheme:
(1) opportunity for local self-expression, (2) development and use of local talent,
(3) programs for children, (4) religious programs, (5) educational programs, (6)
public affairs programs, (7) editorializing, (8) political broadcasts, (9) agricul-
tural programs, (10) news programs, (11) weather and market reports, (12)
sports programs, (13) service to minority groups and (14) entertainment. Com-
mission Policy on Programming, 20 P & F RADIO REG. 1901 (1960).
Nevertheless, FCC attempts to create balanced programming formats are criticized for
producing an opposite effect. See Robinson, supra note 38, at 121-22.
The concern for greater relevance to community needs resulted in a 1968 statement
which outlined procedures under which a station could ascertain local program require-
ments and modify its format accordingly. The four factors deemed significant by the
Commission were: (1) documentation of the applicant's efforts to determine the needs
of the local community, (2) suggestions he has received, (3) his appraisal of those
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In the shadow of this uncertain touchstone, the FCC grants and
renews broadcast licenses. In the renewal proceeding, the burden to
demonstrate compliance with formulated policy falls upon the appli-
cant.45  Thus, the renewal system furnishes a more potent device for
supervising programming schemes than does the harsh measure of
license revocation under which the Commission sustains the burden of
showing non-compliance. 46 However, while the renewal procedure it-
self may be theoretically ideal, its day-to-day operations is woefully
inept.47  Its strength lies in the broadcasters' fear of displeasing the
Commission rather than in effective enforcement to accurately ensure
programming in the public interest.
48
B. Licensees and the First Amendment Rights of the Public
It has long been held that the freedoms of speech and press entail
protection not only for the speaker or publisher but for the listener or
reader as well. 49  The public's "right to know" has, in some cases, out-
suggestions, (4) how he attempts to actualize the worthy ideas through policy
modification. Ascertainment of Community Needs by Broadcast Applicants, 13 P & F
RADIO REG. 2d 1903 (1968). In 1970, the degree to which these community needs
must be served was elevated from minimal to "substantial". Policy Statement on
Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 18 P & F RAnIo REG. 2d
1901 (1970).
For a study of the constitutional inadequacy of the public interest standard, see Note,
Morality and the Broadcast Media: A Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory
Standards, 84 HARv. L. REv. 664, 694-99 (1971).
45. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The court explained that "[like public officials charged
with a public trust, a renewal applicant . . . must literally 'run on his record.'" Id.
46. 47 U.S.C. § 312(d) (1970).
47. Applications are considered in an administrative fantasyland where a handful of
lawyers and program analysts are charged with the responsibility of reviewing ap-
proximately 2,400 applications annually, each of which consists of a "plethora of forms".
Pember, The Broadcaster and the Public Interest: A Proposal to Replace An Unfaith-
ful Servant, 4 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 83, 90 (1971), citing Inside the FCC, TELEVISION
AGE, Aug. 25, 1969, at 72.
48. A memorandum from the Commission regarding its "attention" to some possible
format deficiency is frequently sufficient to effect an immediate conformity to FCC
"suggestions". See Pierson, The Need For Modification Of Section 326, 18 FuD. CoM.
B.J. 15, 19-20 (1963) wherein the author notes:
On occasion [the licensee] is almost directly threatened with costly litigation un-
less program proposals are changed. . . . To deny that this constraint exists is
to indulge in pure myth. To say that . . . an applicant proposes or "promises"
programs on the basis of his independent judgment of the needs and wants of his
area compounds the myth.
Note, Morality and the Broadcast Media: A Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory
Standards, 84 HARv. L. REv. 664, 666-69 (1971).
49. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), citing Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). In Joseph v. FCC, 404 F.2d 207, 211 (D.C.
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weighed the application of libel laws, 0 the right of privacy,'; and the
individual's interest in the safeguarding of his professional reputation. 2
In 1949, the FCC characterized the public's right to be informed as
"the foundation stone of the American system of broadcasting."'5
Nevertheless, until recently, most efforts to effectively subordinate the
interests of the licensees to those of the public have failed.
4
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC5 the Supreme Court delin-
eated for the first time a set of principles with which to balance the
conflicting First Amendment rights of listeners and broadcasters. In
affirming the FCC's authority to prescribe rules regarding campaign
editorials and on-the-air personal attacks, the Court went beyond the
vague rights "to know" and "to be informed" and recognized a public
right to "receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences. . . ."il While declining to enumerate
further the guarantees involved, the Court held that "[it is the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount. 5 T  Licensees are to be considered as proxies for their
listeners, "obligated to give suitable time and attention to matters of
great public concern.
'5 8
Cir. 1968), the court noted that public interest demands the "widest possible dissemi-
nation of information from diverse and antagonistic sources," quoting Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). See also Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
50. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
51. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).
52. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
53. Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949).
54. E.g., Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d
497, 501 (1st Cir. 1950) (defendant radio station held not affected by constitutional
restrictions against the abridgment of speech since "this Amendment limits only the
action of Congress or of agencies . . . and not private corporations. . . ." Accord,
McIntire v. Win. Penn Broadcasting Co. of Philadelphia, 151 F.2d 597, 601 (3d Cir.
1945).
55. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See Note, The Listener's Right to Hear in Broadcasting,
22 STAN. L. REv. 863 (1970), for an excellent analysis of possible future developments
in the public's rights with respect to broadcasters.
56. 395 U.S. at 390.
57. Id. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (upholding laborers' right to
hear speech of union organizer); Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188, 192 (M.D.
Ala. 1969) (upholding right of students to hear controversial political speaker).
58. 395 U.S. at 394. The Court also referred to a licensee as a "fiduciary with obli-
gations to present those views and voices which are representative of his commu-
nity. . . ." Id. at 389. In Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court complains that "[alfter nearly
five decades of operation the broadcast industry does not seem to have grasped the
simple fact that a broadcast license is a public trust subject to termination for breach
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Other courts have refused to limit the rights of listeners to the
language of Red Lion. Noting that the scope of the Court's task was
relatively narrow in that case, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace
v. FCC59 recently delineated two additional rights in the course of de-
termining that a licensee's prohibition of all paid announcements
concerning controversial public issues was in violation of the First
Amendment. The first concerns the method of broadcasting contro-
versial opinions, as separate from the issue of the discussion's content.
Recognizing the need for an "'uninhibited marketplace of ideas' "60 the
court concluded that the exchange of views must be "'robust and wide-
open.' ,0 The broadcasters were cautioned against excluding any dis-
cussion of topics merely because they "'invite dispute [since freedom
of speech] may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces
a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they
are, or even stirs people to anger.' "62 The second public right added
by the court is significant in that it concerns topics outside the cate-
gories of current events and public debate. This is the interest of "in-
dividuals and groups in effective self-expression." 63  The licensee's
duty is to make available his facilities so that the need for the com-
munication of individual views will be fulfilled. 4
C. The Obscenity Standard
It is now clear that the broadcaster, as a public servant, has at the
least an affirmative duty to ensure that listeners are exposed to a wide
diversification of opinion with respect to both public and private af-
of duty." See Note, The Public Domain And a Right of Access: Effect Upon the
Broadcast Media, 3 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 451, 459-61 (1970).
59. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3415 (U.S. Feb. 29,
1972). The circuit court recognized that Red Lion utilized the public's rights in
upholding legislative and administrative activity already instituted, a problem less
sweeping than the issue of attacking FCC policy, 450 F.2d at 650.
60. 450 F.2d at 655, quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969).
61. 450 F.2d at 655, quoting National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d
194, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
62. 450 F.2d at 666, quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). While
the court was careful to confine its actual decision to the listeners' free speech interests
in the licensee's allocation of advertising time (450 F.2d at 654), it made clear that
the principles of Red Lion and the additional rights discussed in the instant case are
applicable to non-advertising time as well. Id. at 655 n.32.
63. 450 F.2d at 655.
64. Id.
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fairs, even if the topics are so volatile that their broadcast creates a
"condition of unrest." However, mere recognition of the listener's
right and the licensee's duty is not determinative of the full scope of
FCC regulatory power. The character of a specific media will also be
indicative of the degree of regulation permissible in light of First
Amendment freedoms. 5 Dissemination factors have been held to
justify restrictions in three areas: the original licensing scheme (ne-
cessitated by the limited number of broadcast frequencies), 66 the tele-
casts of trials, 6r and the broadcast of obscenity.0 8  This last category
entails recognition of the fact that reception of programming is a more
passive occurrence than participation in other forms of mass com-
munication. The FCC has declared that
it is crucial to bear in mind the difference between radio and other
media. Unlike a book which requires the deliberate act of purchasing
and reading (or a motion picture where admission to public exhibition
must be actively sought), broadcasting is disseminated generally to the
65. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969), the Supreme
Court stated that "differences in the characteristics of media justify differences in the
First Amendment standards applied to them." For a "compendium of views", the
Court cited FREEDOM AND RrSPONSIrTY IN BROADCASTING (J. Coons ed. 1961), and
made additional reference to M. ERNST, THE FIRsT FREEDOM 125-80 (1946); T. RoBIN-
SON, RADIO NETWORKS AND THE FEDERAL GOvERNMENT 75-87 (1943); and Kalven,
Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAw & EcoN. 15 (1967),
who notes that in Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), the Court rejected the
contention that motion pictures differ from other media as to First Amendment appli-
cation. The Burstyn Court stated, however, that "[ejach method tends to present its
own peculiar problems." Id. at 503. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96-97 (1949),
represents a further judicial expression of the differences between the various forms
of communication. Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587
(1954) and United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), again
affirm the concept that the extent of First Amendment protection may vary from
media to media.
66. See text accompanying notes 38-48 supra.
67. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). There, Justice Clark declared: "It is said,
however, that the freedoms granted in the First Amendment extend a right to the news
media to televise from the courtroom. . . . This is a misconception of the rights of
the press." Id. at 539. The Justice listed many situations in which the presence of
television equipment and crews "might cause actual unfairness": impact on prospective
jurors, distractions affecting litigants, jury, counsel and judge, a diminishing of the
quality of testimony from publicity-conscious witnesses (causing memory lapse, over-
dramatization, etc.), political implications (if the judge is an elected official) and
"mental-if not physical-harassment". Id. at 544-49. Accord, Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1966).
68. See Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
843 (1964); Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147, 1 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 747 (1964).
Additionally, section 1464 of title 18 of the United States Code prohibits radio
broadcasting of "any obscene, indecent or profane language." 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970).
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public . ..under circumstances where reception requires no activ-
ity of this nature. Thus, it comes directly into the home ...without
advance warning of its content.69
In addition to this "captive audience" theory, cases involving the
broadcast of obscenity must consider the rights and interests of mi-
nors. Since rock radio audiences consist in large measure of youths,
the extent to which their freedoms of speech i.e., rights to know and
to receive information, differ from those of adults becomes particularly
significant. The First Amendment status of minors has been considered
not only in the area of obscenity but also in situations involving the
rights of students to speak and to demonstrate on school grounds. A
leading free speech decision, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School District,70 addressed the rights of students to express
their views as compared to the rights and duties of education admin-
istrators to conduct the operation of their institutions. The Supreme
Court expressed the conviction that students are afforded full eli-
gibility to First Amendment rights .7 1  In prescribing criteria for per-
missible restrictions, lower courts have determined that only a material
and substantial disruption of discipline would justify restraint upon
expression of ideas.72  As Justice Stewart summarized in Tinker (al-
though he did not himself adhere to the conviction): "[Sichool dis-
cipline aside, the First Amendment rights of children are co-extensive
with those of adults.' ' 3
In the obscenity area, when minors are involved, the government's
regulatory power is recognized to be more extensive than such au-
thority over adults.74  The Supreme Court has formulated legislative
69. Eastern Educational Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 411, 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 860,
864 (1970) (emphasis in original); Note, Morality and the Broadcast Media: A Con-
stitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory Standards, 84 HARv. L. Rav. 664, 680-86
(1971).
70. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
71. Id. at 511.
72. See, e.g., Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966); Dunn v. Tyler
Independent School Dist., 327 F. Supp. 528, 532 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Lee v. Board
of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1971); Katz v. McAulay, 438 F.2d 1058,
1060 (2d Cir. 1971); Jones v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Arizona, 436 F.2d
618, 621 (9th Cir. 1970); Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1265 (7th Cir. 1970).
73. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
74. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968). See Emerson, Toward A
General Theory Of The First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 939 (1963); Magrath,
The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. Cr. REv. 7, 75. See generally
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944); Comment, Exclusion of Children
from Violent Movies, 67 CoLtmu. L. Rav. 1149, 1159-60 (1967); Note, Constitutional
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standards under which this broader range of control over minors may
be executed. In Ginsberg v. New York,75 the Court held that the state
has an interest "'to protect the welfare of children' and to see that they
are 'safeguarded from abuses' which might prevent their 'growth into
free and independent well-developed men and citizens.' "70 The deter-
minative criterion was whether exposure to the materials in question
constituted such an abuse.77 Recognizing the great difficulty or im-
possibility in obtaining precise and irrefutable evidence proving the
harmful effects of obscenity, the Court required "only that we be able
to say that it was not irrational for the legislature to find that ex-
posure [to the questionable material] is harmful to minors.17 8
This broad and permissive standard, however, has never been ap-
plied outside the area of obscenity. In fact, the fifth circuit has held
that the societal interest which justifies censorship on behalf of minors
is not all-inclusive:
[]he long history of the misuse of the censorship power convinces us
that the standard for classification must be restricted to the control of
obscenity. . . . While we recognize the interest of society in protect-
ing children, we find even the child's freedom of speech too precious
to be subjected to the whim of the censor. .... 79
Moreover, it is submitted that should the Ginsberg standard be ex-
tended in an attempt to justify Notice 71-205, the FCC edict would fail
to meet this liberal test because of the complete dearth of evidence that
lyrics may cause drug usage and in light of the available sources which
indicate the contrary.80
D. The Imminency Standard
Advocacy of illegal conduct is protected under the First Amendment
Problems in Obscenity Legislation Protecting Children, 54 GEo. L.J. 1379 (1966).
A primary rationale for permitting greater authority over minors is found in the
traditional notions concerning the need for parental control in directing the upbringing
of children. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968); People v. Kahan, 15
N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334 (1965) (Fuld, J., concurring). However, should
this power be used in such a manner so as to restrict adults as well as children, the
action will be deemed to infringe upon the due process guaranty of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957).
75. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
76. Id. at 640-41.
77. Id. at 641. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 402-03 (1923).
78. 390 U.S. at 641.
79. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590, 598-99 (5th Cir. 1966)
(emphasis added). See Comment, Exclusion of Children from Violent Movies, 67
COLuM. L. REv. 1149, 1155-68 (1967).
80. See text accompanying notes 82-84 infra.
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until the point where it "is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."81  To
restrict "drug lyrics" some reasonable cause-and-effect relationship
between lyrics and such illegal activity must exist. Yet nowhere in
Notice 71-205 does the Commission declare or imply this causal link.
Instead, the Notice appears to rest upon an unspoken administrative as-
sumption which is by no means beyond contention. The Executive
Director of the National Coordinating Council on Drug Abuse and
Education, Inc.,82 has declared that he and his staff
have made a thorough search of all known and available studies in
this and related areas and. have been unable to find any scientific
study to substantiate in any manner a conclusion that there is a cause
and effect relationship between song lyrics and drug abuse.83
The same conclusion was reached by the Director of the Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.8 4
There is no doubt that the use of narcotics entails tragic consequences,
the mitigation. of which irrefutably comprises a valid governmental
objective. Further, it is reasonably arguable that a clear advocacy of
drug use by an influential celebrity may tend to have at least some
sanctioning effect upon an extremely impressionable young listener.
Nevertheless, since there has been no causal link discovered between
the restricted speech and the evil sought to be curtailed, and since the
nature of radio has not been held to justify restraints outside of the triad
of general categories previously noted,8 5 Notice 71-205 must be con-
sidered to be at the least an edict of questionable constitutional validity.
E. Governmental Regulation of Speech: Administrative Standards
Critical to our system of jurisprudence is the maxim that courts alone
81. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
82. The Council is a non-profit entity whose membership includes over ninety di-
verse organizations such as the ABA, American Legion, the AMA, Red Cross, Boy
Scouts of America, Department of Defense, CORE, NAACP, International Ass'n of
Chiefs of Police, the FDA, and the YMCA.
.83. Plaintiff's Motions for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction,
Affidavit of Peter G. Hammond, Executive Director of the National Coordinating
Council on Drug Abuse and Education Inc., at 2, Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
Civil No. 71-1780 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 7, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Yale].
84. Plaintiffs Motions for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction,
Exhibit 4, Appendix G, in Yale, supra note 83. Director John E. Ingersoll stated that
he doubts that popular songs with drug lyrics have caused narcotics abuse among listen-
ers, adding that no one has ever seriously suggested that drinking songs are a cause of
alcoholism. He said that the FCC had not asked his opinion prior to the issuance of
Public Notice 71-205.
85. See notes 66-68 supra and accompanying text.
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possess the competency to adjudge the nature of speech as to its con-
stitutional status.86  Decades ago, Chief Justice Hughes perceived
that although administrative bodies should be empowered to perform a
broad range of factual determinations, independent judicial scrutiny
must ensue when constitutional issues are at stake.8 7 Current adher-
ence to this principle is demonstrated by numerous decisions. s8 In
Freedman v. Maryland,8 9 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, af-
firmed that:
The teaching of our cases is that, because only a judicial determination
in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom
of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suf-
fices to impose a valid final restraint.90
86. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HAv. L. REV. 518, 520
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Monaghan].
87. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 88-89 (1965).
Monaghan, supra note 86, at 520-21 n.13 notes:
Mr. Justice Brennan's suggestion [in Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478
(1962)] that the first amendment itself demanded a judicial determination of
whether speech was protected avoided the problems that have plagued earlier judi-
cial efforts to establish a doctrine that certain issues could not be withdrawn from
independent judicial judgment. . . . The general problem . . . reached its judicial
zenith in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). There, Chief Justice Hughes...
relied on the article III grant of "judicial power" to hold that de novo, independent
judicial review must exist with respect to "facts" previously found by an adminis-
trative agency which are "constitutional" or "jurisdictional" in nature ....
Since the doctrines espoused in Crowell became clouded by subsequent decisions (see
Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialetic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1374-79 (1953)), Manual Enterprises v.
Day, supra, rested upon First Amendment principles and not upon the Article III
doctrine expressed by Chief Justice Hughes. Monaghan, supra note 86, at 520-21 n.13.
88. E.g., State v. Scott, 460 S.W.2d 103, 108-09 (1970), where a Texas court, quot-
ing United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 309 F. Supp. 36 (C.D. Cal. 1970), de-
termined that:
'Any system of censorship must contain, at the minimum, the following procedural
safeguards if it is not to contravene thie First and Fifth Amendments, (1) any re-
straint prior to judicial determination can be imposed only briefly, and (2) the
-censor in a specified brief period will go to court.'
See Holding v. Nesbitt, 259 F. Supp. 694, 699-70 (W.D. Okla. 1966); United States
v. One Book Entitled 'The Adventures of Father Silas", 249 F. Supp. 911, 920
n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Embassy Pictures Corp. v. Hudson, 242 F. Supp. 975, 977-78 (W.
D. Tenn. 1965); United States v. One Carton Positive Motion Picture Film, 248 F. Supp.
373, 376-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
89. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
90. Id. at 58. Freedman involved a prosecution under a state law which prohibited
the exhibition of motion pictures without first obtaining a license. The Supreme Court
set aside the statute as unconstitutional since (1) upon refusal of an application for
such a permit, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings fell upon the exhibitor;
(2) once the censor had disallowed issuance of a license, the film was banned pending
a court's interpretation; and (3) there was no time limit as to when the judicial deci-
sion had to be made. Id. at 58-60.
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Perhaps this precept for courtroom review is grounded upon the in-
herent functional disparities between judicial and administrative proc-
esses. Long tenure customarily disengages the jurist from immedi-
ate political influence whereas the agency official enjoys no such
insulation. The role of the administrator "is not that of the impartial
adjudicator but that of the expert-a perspective which necessarily gives
an administrative agency a narrow and restricted viewpoint" of matters
within the purview of its activity.!1
In specifying the range of FCC functions, the Communications Act
makes express provision for the issue of censorship. Section 326 de-
crees that:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or
signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio communication.
2
An additional safeguard was provided in a 1948 Senate Committee Re-
port which interpreted section 326 as
[making] clear that the Commission has absolutely no power of cen-
sorship over radio communications and that it cannot impose any regu-
lation or condition which would interfere with the right of free speech
by radio.
93
A granting of those liberties already proclaimed under the Bill of
Rights would constitute a legislative redundancy. Since the definition
of "censorship" as used in section 326 was defined by the Supreme
Court as "any examination of thought or expression in order to prevent
publication of 'objectionable' material,"9 4 it is at least arguable that
in enacting the section Congress was resolved to ordain interdictions
91. Monaghan, supra note 86, at 523.
92. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) (emphasis added).
93. S. REP. No. 1567, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948) (emphasis added).
94. Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 527 (1959) (emphasis added). In
National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
it was held that the Commission possesses the authority to provide for nationwide
subscription television, and that it must administer "a scarce communications resource,
the broadcast spectrum, in such a manner that the great objectives incorporated in the
first amendment are realized and debate on public issues is 'uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open.'" Id. at 207, quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964). Such administration would provide exposure "to a wide variety of 'social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences.'" 420 F.2d at 207, quoting
Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). The circuit court
cautioned that "the Commission must avoid the perils of both inaction and overzeal-
ousness ... and of censorship which would allow the government to control. the
ideas communicated to the public." 420 F.2d at 207.
1972]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
against curbs upon free speech which would supplement the guaranty
of the First Amendment. Congress may not "abridge" and the FCC
may not "interfere" with the right of free speech. The latter pro-
hibition seems patently more stringent, since by definition 5 and under
judicial interpretation, 6 the word "interfere" has been given a more
generic interpretation than "abridge".
1. Notice 71-205: An Embodiment of Excessive
Administrative Censorship
While the Commission does not directly refer to censorship in the
text of Notice 71-205, it nevertheless professes to "point up"'0 7 a broad-
caster's duties regarding drug lyrics, a topic "of current and pressing
concern." g8  Non-compliance "raises serious questions as to whether
continued operation of the station is in the public interest . . .,0
The implication is simple and explicit; the broadcaster receives fair warn-
ing: your license is at stake.
Previous cases have investigated the practical consequences of simi-
lar notices. In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,00 the Supreme
Court determined that restraints by administrative fiat upon that which
has been judicially termed "pure speech"'' are forbidden by the First
Amendment. A state obscenity commission had dispatched notices to
booksellers containing lists of publications found to be objectionable,
accompanied by a note stating that the titles were also being sent to
95. WEBSTER'S Tsunn NEW INT'L DIcTIONARY 1178 (ed. 1966):
Interfere . . . : to come in collision: to be in opposition: to run at cross-pur-
pose: CLASH .... Id.
abridge . . . : to diminish (as a right) by reducing; the danger of abridging the
liberties of the people. . . . Id. at 6.
96. See Schermerhorn v. Local 1625, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla.
1962) (involving labor union conflicts, over issue of whether paying sums to union
equal in amount to membership dues abridged the right to work) where the word
"abridge" was held to mean "anything which imposes a charge or expense upon the
free exercise of a right. . . ." Id. at 276; Piegts v. Local 437, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters Butchers' Workmen of North America, 228 La. 131, 81 So. 2d 835 (1955).
.For judicial definitions of "interfere", see People ex rel. Benefit Ass'n of Railway
Employees v. Miner, 387 Ill. 393, 56 N.E.2d 353 (1944), where "interfere" was con-
strued by the court to connote intermeddling, interposing, taking part in or entering into
the concerns of others. Id. at 356; Highway Trailer Co. v. Janesville Electric Co., 204
N.W. 773 (Wise. 1925).
97. Notice 71-205, supra note 21, at 1.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2.
100. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
101. See text accompanying notes 28-36 supra.
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local law enforcement agencies.10 2 Several recipients contended in
protest that this issuance constituted "a scheme of governmental cen-
sorship devoid of the constitutionally required safeguards for state
regulation of obscenity . .. . The Court concurred, and struck
down both the commission's enabling law and its mode of operation.
The circulars were characterized as containing four features vitiating
their content: (1) they were phrased essentially as edicts; (2) they
were reasonably understood to be such by the recipients; (3) they were
invariably followed up by police visitations; and (4) their practical effect
was to force the booksellers to remove the objectionable books from cir-
culation.' 0 4 The Justices concluded that the notices clearly constituted
instruments of regulation. 0 5
Strong analogies exist between the Bantam notices and Notice 71-205.
First, the latter is phrased virtually as an order, containing these di-
rectives in its text and concurring opinions:
[The licensee] cannot properly follow a policy of playing such records
without. . knowing the content of the lyrics. . . . [Non-compliance]
raises serious questions as to whether continued operation of the station
is in the public interest .... 106
I sincerely hope that [the Notice] . . . will discourage, if not elim-
inate the playing of records which tend to promote and/or glorify tie
use of illegal drugs. . . . I expect the Broadcast Industry to meet its
responsibilities of reviewing records. . . . Obviously. . . the licensee
will exercise appropriate judgment in determining whether the broad-
casting of such records is in the public interest. 10r
A dissent to 71-205 viewed the Notice as "an unsuccessfully disguised
effort... to censor song lyrics . . . aimed clearly at controlling the
content of speech.'1 0 8  Second, 71-205 was interpreted by the broad-
102. 372 U.S. at 61-63. The notices stated in part:
The [Commissioners] have reviewed the following publications and .. . have de-
clared they are completely objectionable for sale, distribution or display for
youths ....
The Chiefs of Police have been given the names of the aforementioned maga-
zines with the order that they are not to be sold, distributed or displayed to
youths ....
The Attorney General will act for us in case of non-compliance. The Commis-
sioners trust that you will cooperate .... Id. at 62 n.5.
103. Id. at 64.
104. Id. at 68.
105. Id. at 69.
106. Notice 71-205, supra note 21, at 2.
107. 28 F.C.C.2d at 410 (H.R. Lee, Comm'r, concurring) (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 412 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting). Commissioner Johnson attacked
the Notice as a blatant censorial action by "establishmentarians" against the youth
culture. Claiming that the licensees cannot meet the factual burdens imposed, the
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casters as constituting "censorship... by fear of license revocation." 00
A survey of the reaction among licensees concluded that most stations
perceive the Notice as an effort to exclude certain songs from the air-
waves."' Finally, as in Bantam, 71-205 initiated the rejection of ma-
terial formerly designated to be appropriate. One owner confiscated
his station's record library and eliminated all Bob Dylan songs "be-
cause the management could not interpret the lyrics.""' Only fifteen
albums were ultimately approved for broadcast. He then informed
announcers that any infringement would cause an immediate conversion
of format from progressive rock to "easy listening.""' 2 Another station
required its announcers to sign statements promising not to air any
record deemed unsuitable by the executives."" Probably the most
common response has been the extensive banning of records through
the circulation of "do-not-play" lists."14  These memoranda often in-
clude popular tunes which have been aired many times before"', and
Commissioner concluded that the Notice is an unconstitutionally "crude attempt to
suppress the anti-establishment music of the counterculture. . . ." Id. at 414.
109. See, e.g., Affidavit of J.H. Irwin, Director of Broadcasting, KUOP-FM, Stock-
ton, Calif., in Yale, supra note 83, at 4.
110. Affidavit of Douglas Wachholz, law student, in Yale, supra note 83, at 4, 20-21.
This document contains the findings of a verified telephone survey of thirteen East
Coast radio stations, conducted in March, 1971. The primary objective of the interviews
was to ascertain the response by radio managers and announcers to Public Notice
71-205. The named individuals agreed to speak "for the record" with knowledge of the
probable publication of their remarks. Mr. Wachholz concluded:
Most stations view (the Notice) as an attempt to censor certain drug lyrics ....
The stations all feel they are "playing with fire" by broadcasting many record lyrics
and some frankly state that the trouble isn't worth it. Id.
111. Affidavit of John Gorman, former announcer and program consultant, WNTN,
Newton, Mass., in Yale, supra note 83, at 2.
112. Id. at 2.
113. Zito, Drug-Lyric Notice Rocks Radio, The Washington Post, Mar. 21, 1971, at
H-7, referring to WMBD-FM, Baltimore, Md.
114. Id. At WDAS-FM, Philadelphia, Pa., the number of unsuitable songs rose
from thirteen to over five hundred in one week; at WHMC-AM, Gaithersburg, Md.,
several songs, including "Casey Jones", were banned. Id.
115. For example, the Washington Post noted:
You may never again hear "With A Little Help From My Friends" on your fa-
vorite radio station. The song appears on the Beatles' "Sgt. Pepper's Lonely
Hearts Club Band" LP, probably the single most important rock recording ever
produced in terms of both the widespread attention it received and the influence
it exerted on rock as a musical form. The album has sold over 3 million copies
in this country alone. . . and the song has been broadcast thousands of times. Id.
See Affidavit of Steve Leon, former Program Director, WDAS-FM, Philadelphia,
Pa., in Yale, supra note 83, at 3 wherein Mr. Leon lists songs banned as including
"White Rabbit" (Jefferson Airplane), "I Am the Walrus" (Beatles), and "One Toke
Over The Line" (Brewer & Shipley); Affidavit of Douglas Wachholz, in Yale, supra
note 83, at 17-18 wherein Mr. Wachholz lists songs banned by WHBG, Harrisonburg,
Va., including "Lucy In The Sky With Diamonds" (Beatles), "Coming Into Los An-
COMMENTS
even songs which are violently anti-drug."1 6
2. Notice 71-205: An Excessive Burden and Prior Restraint
The Bantam Court held that the state had subjected the dissemina-
tion of printed matter to a "system of prior administrative restraints." '' l
The constitutional infirmity of the obscenity commission's operation
was three-fold: (1) the state failed to provide for judicial supervision
of the formulation of restrictions, (2) there was no assurance that the
restraints, once imposed, were then subject to judicial corrobora-
tion or review, and (3) the mandate was vague and uninformative.11
The result was that an administrative body was establishing a restraint
upon speech. The "system of informal censorship", therefore, was
held to violate the First Amendment as applied to the states by virtue
of the Fourteenth Amendment."1 9 These same defects exist with respect
to Public Notice 71-205. There is neither a stipulation for judicial
superintendence of the establishment of restrictions which truncate pro-
gram content, nor is provision made for judicial review of the applica-
tion of administrative restraints. Instead, licensees are presented with a
vague and ambiguous document and are expected to conduct their pro-
grams in accordance with its prescriptions.
Brief consideration of broadcast systems exposes the magnitude of
the burdens left in the wake of Notice 71-205. The Notice directs
inter alia that licensees shall determine the connotation of all lyrics
antecedent to broadcast, 20 an exaction which prefatorily necessitates
the ascertainment and interpretation of the words themselves. The order
geles" (Arlo Guthrie), "With a Little Help From My Friends" (Beatles), "Mr. Tam-
bourine Man" (Bob Dylan, The Byrds).
116. Affidavit of Douglas Wachholz, in Yale, supra note 83, at 17-19 reports that
several Eastern stations pulled "The Pusher" (by Steppenwolf), some of the lyrics of
which are contained in the text accompanying notes 198-99 infra. He notes the exclu-
sion of "Snowblind Friend", recorded by the same group, discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 200-03 infra.
117. 372 U.S. at 70.
118. Id. at 70-71. The effect of these deficiencies was that there existed "no safe-
guards whatever against the suppression of . . . constitutionally protected . .. mat-
ter." Id. at 70. The prior administrative restraint ensued
since the Commission is not a judicial body and its decisions to list particular
publications as objectionable do not follow judicial determinations that such
publications may lawfully be banned. Any system of prior restraints of expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.
Id.
See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
119. 372 U.S. at 71.
120. Notice 71-205, supra note 21, at 1 3.
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is unreasonable. A typical rock radio station acquires an enormous
number of new records, usually fifty to one hundred albums in a seven-
day period, in addition to scores of "singles". 121  A standard
album contains from ten to fourteen songs. Therefore, a licensee
may have to consider as many as fifteen hundred separate tunes each
week and perhaps sixty or seventy thousand songs in one year. In
view of this massive influx of recordings, disc jockeys often spend
only ten to twenty seconds hearing each new release.12 2  When it is
recognized that station libraries ordinarily contain as many as five or six
thousand records, 123 it becomes apparent that listening to this volume
of material in its entirety would be a herculean task. Experienced ra-
dio employees estimate that one individual would spend over two years
reviewing a typical station library,' 24 and that to embrace both the
library and new releases would require "four extra staff members six
months just to keep current."' 25  In addition, a broadcaster may rely
heavily or even exclusively upon the private collections of staffers.' 20
Compounding these problems is the fact that a multitude of
records would require more than one hearing to guarantee a me-
ticulous determination of the words, since the volume of the recorded
instruments may be relatively high. "[Miany rock bands use voice
almost as an additional instrument-for its sound quality and texture,
not for words.'12 7  Since a modem rock anthem may consist of eight
or more recorded tracks, the primary voice may be simultaneously
competing with a full orchestra, a choir, a rock band, other voices-
talking, singing, chanting or shouting (perhaps recorded backwards)-
121. Affidavit of Mark Gorbulew, rock announcer and Program Director, WHFS-
FM, Wash., D.C., in Yale, supra note 83, at 2. Mr. Gorbulew notes that most "serious"
rock stations receive up to 100 long play (33 1/3 rpm) records per week, plus "dozens
or hundreds" of singles (45 rpm).
122. Id. at 3.
123. Affidavit of J.H. Irwin, in Yale, supra note 83, at 10 wherein it is stated that
KUOP-FM, Stockton, Calif., has a library of 2,000 progressive rock albums. Affidavit
of Steve Leon, in Yale, supra note 83, at 4 wherein it is estimated that WDAS, Phila-
delphia possesses "at least 7,000 albums". Affidavit of Mark Gorbulew, in Yale, supra
note 83, at 2 wherein Mr. Gorbulew cites WABC-FM, New York, estimating its total
from 4,000 to 5,000 records. Affidavit of Charles Laquidara, rock announcer, KPPC-
AM, Pasadena, Calif., and WBCN-FM, Boston, Mass., in Yale, supra note 83, at 3
wherein he estimates that WBCN's albums number from 4,000 to 6,000.
124. Affidavit of Stuart Jackson, Chairman, Yale Broadcasting Co., New Haven,
Conn., in Yale, supra note 83, at 2.
125. Affidavit of Charles Laquidara, in Yale, supra note 83, at 3.
126. Affidavit of Mark Gorbulew, in Yale, supra note 83, at 3-4 wherein the figure
is placed at over ninety percent for some stations.
127. Id. at 6.
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plus countless sound effects, all deliberately arranged and engineered to
create a massive total impact. A less complex but equally bewilder-
ing obstacle is that the lyrics may be intentionally slurred by the singer.
One station's rock music director and several associates were required
to listen to the relatively uncomplicated arrangement of "White Rab-
bit"'2 recorded by Jefferson Airplane for more than thirty minutes
before ascertaining all of the words. 12 9
Since many stations do not have the personnel or technical equip-
ment to handle the increased listening burdens,130 record companies
are often requested to provide printed sheets containing the words to
all songs distributed for broadcast.' 3' Other stations employ secre-
taries who primarily listen to new shipments of records and prepare
lyric sheets.' 32 The supplementary expenses and efforts necessitated
by the circulation of these printings is at least indirectly imputable to
the FCC. However, even a total resolution of the listening quandary
would not eradicate the insoluable dilemma arising from the order
requiring determination of the meaning of lyrics. The problem is
multiplied by the inherent ambiguities in the art itself.
Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority in Speiser v. Randall,'33
stated that "the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and
speech which may legitimately be regulated . . . is finely drawn".
128. "White Rabbit" by Gracie Slick, copyright 1967, Copperpenny Music Pub. Co.
129. Affidavit of Mark Gorbulew, in Yale, supra note 83, at 7. Referring to the
song "I Am the Walrus" (Beatles), the affiant noted that he had unsuccessfully at-
tempted to ascertain some of the words. Additionally, he stated that a fearful Program
Director might "easily decide not to second-guess the FCC, and ban the record." Id.
130. Id. All stations possess a main broadcasting facility for on-the-air pro-
gramming; most have a second studio for producing advertisements. During a typical
day, both studios are in constant use. There is no convenient place to conduct the
pre-screening of new records when they arrive unless the station has a third outlet.
Thus, Notice 71-205 could force smaller stations .(and student-operated facilities) to
obtain additional equipment. Id. at 3.
131. Hall, Storz Follows FCC Rule-Demands Lyric With Disc in BMLBoARD MAGA-
zIE, April 3, 1971, at 1, col. 3. Stations requiring lyric sheets include: WDGY,
Minneapolis, KXOX, St. Louis, KOMA, Oklahoma City, WTIX, New Orleans, WQAM,
Miami, WHB, Kansas City, and WING, Dayton. The Program Director of KOIL,
Omaha, is quoted as saying that he would not play any tune with "questionable lyrics"
and that he would "flat tell the record company we won't play the record until we get
the lyrics." Id.
132. Id. Stenographers compile lyric sheets at WTOB, Winston-Salem, WSGN,
Birmingham, WKIX, Raleigh, and WPGC, Washington, D.C.
133. 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) (statute which denied tax exemption to persons who
refuse to sign a statement on tax returns that they do not advocate the overthrow
of the Government, held violative of Fourteenth Amendment due process in that it
placed burden of proof on taxpayer).
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This canon is clearly ignored, however, in 71-205's dictate requiring
"reasonable efforts to ascertain the meaning of words or phrases used
in the lyrics."' 34  A predominant hallmark of music is its pliable
nature, its susceptibility to variable interpretations. The vast dis-
semination of rock owes much to the fact that due to multiple mean-
ings a single song may be suited to the tastes of what would other-
wise constitute disparate listening groups. "A song, after all, is not a
speech. Like any work of art, it bounces back different meanings to
different people at different times, as life shines new light upon it."'185
Beatle Paul McCartney agreed, saying:
We write songs; we know what we mean by them. But in a week
someone else says something about it, says that it means that as well,
and you can't deny it. Things take on millions of meanings. I don't
understand it.136
The Vice-President of the United States cautioned that much of
popular music is "blatant drug-culture propaganda."' 13  Illustrating
his point, he referred to "Acid Queen"'8 s by The Who. The lyrics
read in part:
I'm the gypsy, the Acid Queen. . .pay before we start ....
I'm the gypsy, the Acid Queen. . . I'll tear your soul apart ....
My work is done now, look at him . ..
his head it shakes, his fingers clutch, watch his body writhe ...
I'm guaranteed to break your little heart ...
It is difficult to envision a more glaring recognition of the allegedly
ravaging consequences of the use of LSD. Nevertheless, the Vice-Presi-
dent reproached these and other lyrics, charging that "these songs
present the use of drugs in such an attractive light that for the im-
pressionable, 'turning on' becomes the natural and even the approved
thing to do."' 9
The interpretation of lyric meanings is no less a perplexing chore for
seasoned disc jockeys. Subsequent to the publication of the Notice,
134. Notice 71-205, supra note 21, at f 3.
135. P. SEEGER, A ROCK ANTHOLOGY: WHEN THE MODE OF THE MUSIC CHANGES
1 (1971).
136. A. Aldridge, Beatles Not All That Turned On, in THE AGE OF RocK 138 (J.
Eisen ed. 1969).
137. Address by Vice-President Agnew, Nevada Republican Dinner, Las Vegas,
Nevada, Sept. 14, 1970.
138. "Acid Queen" by Peter Townsend, copyright 1969, Essex Music. The author
is quoted as declaring, "Drugs are harmful mentally, spiritually, and physically .... t
ROLLING STONE MAGAZINE, Nov. 26, 1970, at 25.
139. Address by Vice-President Agnew, Nevada Republican Dinner, Las Vegas,
Nevada, Sept. 14, 1970.
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three different radio stations considered the same song. One decided
to continue playing it, another placed it in the ambiguous status of
"under review", and the third took it off the air.140 Yet this is not
an isolated instance of confusion. Alarmed broadcasters, protesting
the issuance of Notice 71-205, have cited scores of records composed
of unfathomable lyrics.
141
Even if a musical or poetic phrase were to have only one meaning
(an improbable occurrence), further inquiries may linger. The song
may contain obvious satire, such as "The Pause of Mr. Clause" :142
Let's get Santa Clause 'cause
Santa Clause has a red suit,
He's a communist;
And a beard and a long hair,
Must be a pacifist.
What's in that pipe he's smoking?
Mister Clause sneaks in your house at night,
He must be a dope fiend to put you up-tight.'
43
Does the implication of the pipe's content subject the song to Notice
140. BROmACASTr G MAGAZrNE, Mar. 22, 1971, at 73. The song is "What About
Me?" by J.O. Farrel, copyright 1967, Quicksilver Music.
141. Affidavit of J.H. Irwin, in Yale, supra note 83, at 7 discusses several Beatle hits,
including "Let It Be" (is the reference to Mother Mary a religious one, or is "Mary"
a code for marijuana?); "Hey Jude" (is the mention of the phrase "under your skin"
in fact a clever message urging the use of a hypodermic needle for narcotics con-
sumption?); "Lucy In The Sky With Diamonds" (are the first letters of the title words
a reference to LSD? If the song is about drugs, does it tend to promote, or glorify,
drug use?).
For a non-drug interpretation of Beatle lyrics, see R. Poirier, Learning From The
Beatles, in THE AGE OF RocK 160, 174 (J. Eisen ed. 1969). The argument is presented
that Beatle lyrics serve to illustrate that the arts or the news media can influence one's
vision of the world to a degree as exciting as any drug-induced experience. For
example, "Lucy In The Sky With Diamonds" suggests that the listener can "picture"
himself on a "trip" without actually taking such a trip himself. "The Beatles won't be
reduced to drugs when they mean, intend, and enact so much more." Mr. Poirier quotes
Beatle George Harrison as telling the Los Angeles Free Press that LSD "is not the an-
swer, definitely not the answer." Id.
In Yale Broadcasting Company v. FCC, Civil No. 71-1780 (D.D.C., filed Feb.
7, 1971), the following persons, alarmed by the Notice, joined as party plaintiffs:
Steve Leon, formerly of WDAS-FM and WDAS-AM, Philadelphia; Mark Gorbulew,
veteran of twoNew York stations and another in Washington, D.C.; Sara Vass, also
of New York and Washington, D.C.- radio experience; John Gorman and Kenneth
Currier, formerly of WNTN, Newton, Mass.; James Irwin, KUoP-FM, Stockton,
Calif.; and Charles Laquidara, formerly with. KPPC-AM & FM, Los Angeles, and
WBCN-FM, Boston.
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71-205 as "language tending to promote or glorify the use of illegal
drugs such as marijuana . . ."? Reasonable minds certainly must
differ in answering this query. Additionally, the literary categories of
fiction, fantasy, legend, imagery, and mythology, all suggest by definition
an escape from reality through the employment of allusions and
imagery. Licensees now will have to determine the status of these
ancient lyrical techniques which are so abundant in the popular records
of the 1960's and 1970's. Consider this verse:
Then take me disappearing through the smoke rings of my mind
Down the foggy ruins of time, far past the frozen leaves
The haunted frightened trees out to the windy beach
Far from the twisted reach of crazy sorrow
Yes, to dance beneath the diamond sky with one hand wavin' free
Silhouetted by the sea, circled by the circus sands
With all memory and fate driven deep beneath the waves
Let me forget about today until tomorrow
Hey, Mister Tambourine Man, play a song for me. .... 144
Is this in fact "blatant drugculture propaganda"?
The preceding illustrations of lyrics which may well be within the
ambit of Notice 71-205 are reminiscent of the excessive burdens which
constituted the determinative factor of the Supreme Court's ruling in
Smith v. California.145 There, a bookstore owner had been convicted
of the sale of obscene publications under a state statute which in effect
held him strictly liable for the content of the thousands of books and
magazines contained within his shop. The Court recognized that ob-
scene material is excluded from the shield of First Amendment safe-
guards and that prohibition of its dissemination comprised a justifiable
state interest. However, the overwhelming operational requirement of
pre-screening the entire inventory of a bookstore was adjudged to be a
virtually impossible task. An unlawful restraint was thus imposed up-
on the proprietor's freedom to conduct his business, since he would
restrict himself to selling only those publications which he had per-
sonally inspected. In order to operate his establishment at its fullest
capacity, the owner would be required to be aware of the contents of
every book in the shop. As the Court concluded, "[ilt would be al-
together unreasonable to demand so near an approach to omnis-
cience."'1 46- Recognizing that the right to publish and distribute books is
144. "Mr. Tambourine Man" by Bob Dylan, copyright 1964, M. Witmark & Sons.
The Wachholz Affidavit, in Yale, supra note 83, at 18 notes that WHBG, Harrisonburg,
Va., took the song off the air following promulgation of the Notice.
145. 361 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1959).
146. Id. at 153, quoting The King v. Ewart, 25 N.Z.L.R. 709, 729 (C.A. 1905).
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a clearly protected First Amendment freedom and that the role of
the bookseller is a crucial one, the Court held that the ordinance vio-
lated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which
secures the freedom of the press against state abridgment. The effect
of a prior restraint upon the public at large is as opprobrious as its
restriction upon the distributor or speaker.' 47 As summarized in
Smith, "the bookseller's burden would become the public's burden, '148
because the public's access to reading matter would be abridged.
There exists a striking similarity between the factual and legal context
of Smith and Public Notice 71-205. The burden of listening to thou-
sands of records and tapes is cardinally analogous to the duty of exam-
ining as many books and magazines. Furthermore, the declared re-
strictive criterion of "tending to promote or glorify the use of illegal
drugs" is no less undecipherable a standard than the enshrouded def-
inition of obscenity, 149 as demonstrated by the radio industry's cha-
otic reaction to the FCC's mandate. Wincing from the same kind of
uncertainty and fear as befell the booksellers under the legislation
invalidated in Smith,150 the radio licensees have tended to abridge
playlist content to include only those records which feature unam-
biguous words. The impenetrable riddle of decoding lyrics yields a
profusion of marginal situations and borderline cases. This predica-
ment has resulted in a "take no chances" attitude. Questionable
tunes, some of them enormously popular, are eliminated"5 since, as
one Program Director stated: "[Ilf it's not clear, or it's marginal, then
The Court reports that the requirement of scienter in prosecutions for the distribution
of obscene matter was established at common law. 361 U.S. at 153 n.9, citing Attorney
General v. Simpson, 93 Ir. L.T.R. 33, 37-38 (Dist. Ct. 1958); but cf. Obscene Publica-
tions Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66 § 2(5); ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(7).
147. See text accompanying notes 49-65 supra.
148. 361 U.S. at 153.
149. The Supreme Court's assessment of the status of the obscenity definition in
numerous cases reflects a futile exercise in attempting to define the indefinable. See
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion), for a vivid illustra-
tion of judicial confusion.
150. See text accompanying notes 145-148 supra.
151. Interviewer Wachholz concluded that the reaction of the stations "was to
eliminate any and all songs with uncertain lyrics." Wachholz Affidavit, in Yale, supra
note 83, at 21. A spokesman for WANV, Waynesboro, Va., is quoted as saying, "If
it's marginal, we won't play it. . . . I'm in a quandry over what to play." Id. at 7.
Zito, Drug-Lyric Notice Rocks Radio, The Washington Post, Mar. 21, 1971, at
H-7 quotes local WMAL's station manager as saying that he could not decide whether
he would continue to play "With A Little Help From My Friends" by the Beatles, since
"[i]t's on one of those fine lines."
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we've got to protect ourselves and we won't play the song ... I don't
know what to do."' 52
After considering the Commission's Notice, a West Coast Director
of Broadcasting speculated that "[t]he ultimate loser in all this will
be the public interest",'158 a conclusion grounded upon his knowledge
of the character and prevailing attitudes of much of the broadcast in-
dustry. A typical progressive rock station shares little in common with
the slick, rigidly-programmed "Top 40" shows.' 5" There is an absence of
both the ubiquitous "hard-sell" advertisements and the loud, cease-
less, rapid-fire gibberish so common among "bubble gum" formats
aimed at the youngest of record buyers and listeners. Perhaps the
most distinctive quality of a progressive station is the creative free-
dom exhibited by individual announcers. You may hear Bach, Dylan,
Presley-all aired on the same show, interspersed with casual im-
promptu comments from an announcer who had chosen each record
only moments before playing it. There are many programs with this
personal, more communicative relationship between broadcaster and
listener. As a result, the frequent anti-drug public service messages
broadcast in such programs are taken quite seriously. A Boston radio
personality notes that since the audience identified with the announcer,
and since the programming and commercials were straightforward and
credible, the listeners would give attention and consideration to the
warnings concerning the dangers of narcotics.'- 5
Public Notice 71-205 is widely viewed as a demoralizing and re-
pressive threat to the spontaneity enjoyed by so many stations, 50 and
it is thought that the exclusion of songs containing vague and thus
questionable lyrics will destroy this credible programming and per-
sonal communication.' 57  Others protest that the threat of censor-
ship is an insurmountable impediment to the pursuit of creative broad-
152. Affidavit of Douglas Wachholz, in Yale, supra note 83, at 7, quoting an execu-
tive of WHBG, Harrisonburg, Va.
153. Affidavit of J.H. Irwin, in Yale, supra note 83, at 14.
154. C. BELZ, THE STORY OF RocK 117 (1969); see also Shearer, Captain Pimple
Cream's Fiendish Plot, in THE AGE oF RocK 357 (J. Eisen ed. 1969).
155. Affidavit of Charles Laquidara, in Yale, supra note 83, at 2.
156. See, e.g., Affidavit of J.H. Irwin, in Yale, supra note 83, at 12-13:
Perhaps the most tragic victim of this Public Notice is the atmosphere of freedom
and self-determination [previously existing]. . . . [The Notice causes] a sense
of repression which has been-and continues to be-severely damaging to the mo-
rale of the staff . . . [they are in] constant fear of losing their positions . . . [and]
we fear to allow them to exercise their individual judgment without constant
review and monitoring.
157. Affidavit of Steve Leon, in Yale, supra note 83, at 5.
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casting.158 Added to this de facto abrogation of a generally informal
technique, there also exist the grievances arising from the denial of
public access to many records which are not played on the more
mechanically-programmed "Top 40" stations. 59
In Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith,160 an administrative
decision expressly based upon the "overriding policy considerations"
of Smith, the Commission itself refused to impose a prescreening
obligation upon a licensee who had been accused of having knowingly
broadcast anti-Semitic material. Petitioners had contended that station
executives were charged with the responsibility to investigate and verify
the correctness of all program material, a process which would eliminate
offensive matter.161 This proposition was determined to be without
merit. The Commission declared that the approach advocated by
plaintiffs would create a "serious and substantial restraint on free
speech.' 0 2  Verification requirements would inhibit the airing of dis-
cussion concerning controversial public issues. This is particularly true
in regard to smaller stations where the costs and time necessitated by
investigation would constitute formidable obstacles. Further, there
had been no showing of consequences harmful to the public interest.
63
Each of the Commission's reasons for the judgment in Anti-Defama-
tion League of B'nai B'rith pertains to the effects of Notice 71-205.
First, significant inhibition of controversial issue programming has
occurred, 64 and second, smaller broadcast facilities face shortages of
158. Id. at 3.
159. Affidavit of Douglas Wachholz, in Yale, supra note 83, at 4 reports that all of
the stations interviewed were 'Top-40" or "middle-of-the-road" as opposed to progressive
stations. Among the hit songs banned by these various stations are: "One Toke Over
The Line" (Brewer & Shipley), "Lucy In The Sky With Diamonds" (Beatles), "The
Pusher" (Steppenwolf) (see text accompanying notes 198-199 infra), "Eight Miles
High" (Byrds), "Coming Into Los Angeles" (Arlo Guthrie), "With A Little Help
From My Friends" (Beatles), "Mr. Tambourine Man" (Bob Dylan, Byrds) (see text
accompanying notes 143-144 supra), "White Rabbit" (Jefferson Airplane) (see text
accompanying notes 128-129 supra), 'Truckin'" (Grateful Dead), "Puff The Magic
Dragon" (Peter, Paul, and Mary), "Snowblind Friend" (Steppenwolf) (see text ac-
companying notes 200-202 infra).
160. 6 F.C.C.2d 385 (1967), af!'d sub nom. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith
v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
161. 6 F.C.C.2d at 385-86.
162. Id. at 386.
163. Id.
164. Affidavit of Steve Leon, in Yale, supra note 83, at 4 notes that a Philadelphia
station had been servicing the college communities with the programming of notices and
bulletins regarding diverse topics including politics, sex, drugs, music, education, etc.
Personal interviews were conducted, and informative comments were broadcast by
radio personalities. Subsequent to Notice 71-205, these efforts were curtailed.
1972]
358 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
the supplementary funds and equipment necessary to execute the Notice's
requirements. 165  Further, there is no indication that lyrics have any
causal effect upon narcotics abuses. 16 6 In other words, there has been
no showing of consequences adverse to the listening public.'0 "
F. Censorship By Threat
Blatant censorship need not exist in order to bring First Amend-
ment protections into effect. Even though a commission may be re-
stricted to informal sanctions such as "coercion, persuasion, and in-
timidation", 68 a court may still, "look through forms to the substance"
and recognize that informal censorship may inhibit circulation of ma-
terials to the same extent as overt prohibition." 9 Threats of prosecu-
tion or of license revocation have been enjoined in many instances."' 0
The Bantam Court perceived that official threats to initiate crimi-
nal proceedings are not casually neglected by the person threatened,"''
and while no criminal charges are included among the penalties for
non-compliance with Notice 71-205, the broadcasters are still "running
scared."1 '2  Persons may abandon the exercise of their constitutional
freedoms in the face of potential forfeiture, be it through criminal
prosecution or license revocation, since the threat of retribution may
deter as surely as the actual imposition of criminal sanctions."78
165. Affidavit of Mark Gorbulew, in Yale, supra note 83, at 3. See note 130 supra.
166. See text accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
167. The Commission makes reference to complaints received from some persons
regarding the airing of drug lyrics, but there is no mention of any established or
alleged harm which has resulted from such broadcasting. See Notice 71-205, supra
note 21.
168. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963).
169. Id.
170. Id. at n.8 and cases cited therein.
171. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. at 67. Accord, Muller v. Conlisk,
429 F.2d 901, 903 (7th Cir. 1970) (mere threat of imposition of sanctions against
free speech is a sufficient present infringement to warrant redress).
172. Zito, Drug-Lyric Notice Rocks Radio, The Washington Post, Mar. 21, 1971,
at H-7.
173. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). In Button, a civil rights group
was charged with violating a Virginia statute which prohibited the fomenting of sham
litigation through the solicitation of "test cases". In setting aside the law as being
susceptible to extensive and improper construction, the Court said:
The threat of sanctions may deter . . . [the exercise of First Amendment rights]
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions. Cf. Smith v. Cali-
fornia, [361 U.S. 147], 151-154 (1959); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526
1958).
Accord, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
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Public Notice 71-205 grounds its authority upon "licensee responsi-
bility,"'174 but as the appellate court noted in Anti-Defamation League:
Talk of "responsibility" of a broadcaster in this connection is simply
a euphemism for self-censorship .... Attempts to impose such
schemes ... have been found as unconstitutional as more direct
censorship efforts .... 175
It is manifest that Public Notice 71-205 is an instrument of censorship
by threat. In the context of 71-205, "licensee responsibility" is in fact
a euphemism for censorship, a realization shared by announcers,'176
station management officials,' 7 7 professional groups, 78 the courts179
and the FCC itself.'80
G. Overbreadth and Vagueness
It is well established that the freedoms of speech and press may
be abridged by an encroachment even less explicit than censorship by
threat. This conviction is embodied in case law under the companion
doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness. An overbroad restriction
steps beyond legitimately proscribed activity into forbidden realms of
constitutionally protected speech.'' The entire content of a law that
174. Notice 71-205, supra note 21.
175. 403 F.2d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See text accompanying notes 162-68
supra.
176. Affidavit of Douglas Wachholz, in Yale, supra note 83, documents reactions of
spokesmen at the following Virginia broadcast stations:
WINA, Charlottesville: "Mhe FCC is saying, 'Even though this isn't a regulation,
you had better watch yourself, because we will ask you questions about it [songs
with drug lyrics] next time your license comes up for renewal."' Id. at 9-10.
WLEE, Richmond: "The government made it very plain that they are looking for
a scapegoat ... and will withdraw the license of any violator." Id. at 9.
WANV, Waynesboro: "[The president] is worried about losing his license."
Id. at 6-7.
WHBG, Harrisonburg: "The threat of taking away your license is certainly there."
Id.
WROV, Roanoke: "[Ylour renewal will be scrutinized more carefully unless you
comply." Id. at 8.
WEEL, Fairfax: "License renewal comes up in 1972, and everybody is holding
their breath." Id. at 10.
177. Id.
178. The Authors League of America, Inc., asked the FCC to reconsider its Notice,
since it felt that the inevitable result would be a self-censorship of fully protected
lyrics. BROADCASTING MAGAZINE, Mar. 22, 1971, at 74.
179. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 172 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), affg 6 F.C.C.2d 385 (1967). See text accompanying notes 162-68 supra.
180. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 6 F.C.C.2d 385, 398 (1967) (concur-
ring statement). It was former Commissioner Loevinger who successfully argued to
the Court of Appeals that "[tialk of 'responsibility' . is simply a euphemism for self-
censorship." Id.
181. The Supreme Court, in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509 (1948), said
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is overbroad on its face may be rendered nugatory. Perhaps the most
favored juristic description of the rudimentary vice of overbreadth is
that it imposes a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms in that it creates an overreaction. 182  This overreaction in-
duces an individual response which " 'steer[s] far wider [of] the unlawful
zone' "183 than is necessary for compliance. Such an ominous reaction
arises in the wake of overly broad regulation because "fear of a wrong
guess" is likely to cause abstention from constitutionally protected
activity.1
8 4
Numerous cases previously cited in the discussion of prior restraint
that a law which was indefinite to the extent that it could be interpreted as permitting
the punishment of "incidents fairly within the protection of the guarantee of free
speech" is invalid on its face. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1968),
rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971), in-
volved a provision of the Illinois Mob Action Statute which defined "mob action" as
the assembly of at least two people to commit an "unlawful act". In holding the law
vague and overbroad, the court explained,
The concept of overbreadth . . . rests on principles of substantive due process
which forbid the prohibition of certain individual freedoms. The primary issue
is not reasonable notice or adequate standards, although these issues may be in-
volved. Rather the issue is whether the language of the statute, given its normal
meaning, is so broad that its sanctions may apply to conduct protected by the
Constitution. Id. at 951 (footnotes omitted).
The court added,
ET]he requirements of clarity, definiteness, and narrow scope are most strictly ob-
served when a statute places a possible limitation upon First Amendment rights.
Id. at 952.
See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
182. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
contains the Supreme Court's first use of the term in a constitutional sense. In Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court determined that a threatened
prosecution warranted federal interdiction in the state criminal process where the
statute was imprecisely defined, a conclusion which constituted an adjustment in
the general policy of abstention from such interference. The threats were viewed as
harassment to discourage petitioners from exercising their civil rights, and the facial
infirmity of the state law, which was adjudged to be "susceptible of sweeping and
improper application," justified the equitable intervention. Id. at 482. But cf. Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The chilling effect is a signal, a warning that there exists impermissible overbreadth
in the language of a statute or ordinance. It is not in itself necessarily sufficient
grounds upon which a law may be invalidated. In some decisions, upon discovery
of a chilling effect, the Court has concluded that alone it creates no requirement for
setting aside the law. In these cases, the Court has taken the further step of applying
the balancing test. See note 35 supra. Examples are Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109, 125-34 (1959) and Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Ac-
tivities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1961). See Note, The Chilling Effect in
Constitutional Law, 69 COLuM. L. REv. 808, 822-30 (1969).
183. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964), quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
184. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
1972] COMMENTS
and censorship were also adjudicated under principles of overbreadth.
One such example is Smith v. California185 which, relying upon Win-
ters v. New York,18 6 declared that the standards for precision may be
more stringent if the statute in question could potentially inhibit the
free dissemination of ideas.
The conceptual link between overbreadth and its chilling effect is
one of cause-and-effect. That is, the regulation plainly trespasses out-
side proper bounds and chills protected communication. However, a
chilling effect may develop even in the absence of an expressly stated
intrusion. If the statute is vague, so that it might extend to, and deter,
legitimate speech, then the infirmity may be equally reprehensible. 187
Governmental action is unconstitutionally vague when it establishes a cri-
terion of protected and unprotected expression in such an ambiguous
fashion that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application."'188 The Supreme Court has
extended the constitutional requirement that Congress may not enact
overbroad or vague legislation to FCC promulgated regulations. 89
185. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
186. 333 U.S. 507 (1948). A New York penal law was construed by the State
Court of Appeals to ban dissemination of materials containing stories or reports of
lust or bloodshed "so massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved
crimes. . . ." Id. at 513. In holding the law so vague and indefinite as to be uncon-
stitutional, the Supreme Court asserted that "[men of common intelligence cannot be
required to guess at the meaning" of criminal laws. Id. at 515 (citing cases therein).
The indefiniteness may arise from the inability to discern the persons within the scope
of the law (Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939)), or in the inability to
formulate a standard under which guilt may be determined (United States v. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89-93 (1921)).
187. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). The Court noted that the
statute in issue "might be construed as embracing conduct which the State could not con-
stitutionally prohibit." Id. at 369. A law which might include as illegal the "peaceful
and orderly opposition to government ... is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty con-
tained in the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. See Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doc-
trine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
188. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (decided on due
process grounds); Accord, Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 951 (N.D. Ill. 1968),
rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971). In
Landry the Court set forth guidelines to be utilized in "determining whether a state
regulation meets (the] standards of clarity and narrowness." Id. at 952. Enumerated
were:
(1) whether a substantial interest worthy of protection is identified or apparent
from the language of the statute; (2) whether the terms of the regulation are
susceptible to objective measurement by men of common intelligence. Id. at 952-53
(footnotes omitted).
189. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 395-96 (1969).
Accord, National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
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It is apparent that overbreadth and vagueness rest upon a common
jurisprudential pedestal. When free speech is at stake, "[pirecision of
regulation must be the touchstone . . . ."10 In First Amendment
cases, the two concepts have been almost totally consolidated. 191 Though
vagueness is cloaked more often in the idiom of Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process while overbreadth is frequently articulated in terms
of First Amendment implications, the Supreme Court applies the
kindred doctrines interchangeably.' 92
It is submitted that Notice 71-205 is patently vague and overbroad.
71-205 does not expressly prohibit the airing of any specific record.
Instead it directs a pre-broadcast ascertainment of lyrics calling for a
determinative interpretation of whether the meaning comprises a pro-
drug message. Furthermore, it states that if station executives are not
cognizant of the broadcast of such records, then "serious questions [will
arise] as to whether continued operation of the station is in the public
interest. . . .193 The Notice's lone dissenting opinion is more forth-
right:
Under the guise of assuring that licensees know what lyrics are being
aired on their stations, the FCC today gives a loud and clear message:
get those "drug lyrics" off the air . . . or you may have trouble at
license renewal time.19
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970) wherein the court stated: "The Commission must be
cautious in the manner in which it acts; regulations which are vague and overbroad
create a risk of chilling free speech." Id. at 208.
190. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); accord, Interstate Circuit, Inc.
v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682-83 (1968) (stating that "[t]he vice of vagueness
is particularly pronounced where expression is sought to be subjected to licensing." Id.
at 683). An exhaustive survey of the principles of overbreadth and vagueness is beyond
the scope of this Comment. See Note, The Chilling Effect In Constitutional Law, 69
CoLuM. L. Rav. 808 (1969); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HAnv. L. REv. 844 (1970); Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67 (1960).
191. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAv. L. Rav. 844, 873
(1970).
192. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965):
[The law] denied due process because it was unduly vague, uncertain and broad
This overly broad statute also creates a "danger zone" within which pro-
tected expression may be inhibited. . . . Even the prospect of ultimate failure
of [threatened] prosecutions by no means dispels their chilling effect on protected
expression. Id. at 494 (citations omitted).
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963):
The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth . . . [depends] upon the
danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence
[of a penal statute] susceptible of sweeping and improper application. Id. at 432-33.
193. Notice 71-205, supra note 21, at f 2.
194. 28 F.C.C.2d at 412 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
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Chaos has resulted because no one, not even veteran disc jockeys
with years of experience in rock music, seems to know what
is meant by "reasonable efforts to ascertain the meaning of words"
which may be "tending to promote or glorify" narcotics. A great many
programming experts find the entire Notice disquietingly nebulous.' 95
On its face the Notice leaves unanswered a decisive question. After
a licensee has fulfilled his specified duties of ascertainment and judg-
ment, what course is he then to take? The FCC only instructs him
that "it is a question of responsible, good faith action.... No more, but
certainly no less, is called for."'
98
A peculiarly ironic consequence of the Notice has been the banning
of anti-drug records,19T (as well as those which are pro-drug and even
non-drug).'g For example, "The Pusher", sung by Steppenwolf,
contains this total denunciation of hard drugs:
I've seen a lot of people walkin' 'round
with tombstones in their eyes,
195. Affidavit of J.H. Irwin, in Yale, supra note 83:
[The Notice is] impractical [and] disconcertingly vague. . . We are assured
that whether or not a song does indeed promote or glorify such usage [of drugs]
is a matter for our judgment as a licensee, but we must make the judgment ...
What constitutes a word, phrase or lyric which tends to "promote or glorify" the
illegal drugs? Id. at 4-5.
Affidavit of Stuart Jackson, in Yale, supra note 83:
I view this notice as being vague, imprecise, and not subject to a clear under-
standing. It offers no standards. . . . Id. at 1.
Affidavit of Douglas Wachholz, in Yale, supra note 83:
None of the stations felt they were able to tell which song lyrics tended to "pro-
mote" or "glorify" the illegal use of drugs. Id. at 21.
Affidavit of Steve Leon, in Yale, supra note 83:
I have been involved in "rock" music and radio broadcasting for over five years.
...[D]espite my experience.. .I could not tell in many cases whether or not a
record "tended to promote or glorify" the illegal use of drugs. Id. at 1-2.
196. Notice 71-205, supra note 21, at q 4.
197. See text accompanying notes 138-39 supra, and notes 115 supra and 198 infra,
for a discussion of the banning of anti-drug songs and for excerpted samples of lyrics.
198. Affidavit of John Gorman, in Yale, supra note 83, relates that at WNTN in
Newton, Massachusetts, a post-Notice 71-205 directive was issued to the effect that only
material contained within the station library was to be considered suitable for airplay,
despite the fact that antecedent to the Notice the majority of the station's music was
from private collections. Afterwards, the station library was screened by the manage-
ment and only one vocal group, King Crimson, was determined to be appropriate. All
other approved material consisted of instrumental recordings. Albums rejected included
all Jefferson Airplane songs, all Bob Dylan songs and "Tommy" (the enormously popu-
lar rock opera by The Who). The affiant was dismissed from his employment, assert-
ing that:
[TIhe track I aired on WNTN was. . . from an album ...by the Wildcat Jug
Band. . . . The album was brought into the station by weekend newsman Ken-
neth Currier. Mr. Currier was also terminated at WNTN for bringing the album
to the station. The track aired had no connection with drugs whatsoever. Id.
at 2.
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but the pusher don't care if you live or die.
God damn the pusher, Goddamn I say, the pusher . . .
The pusher is a monster, that guy he not a natural man.
The pusher will ruin your body, Lord he will lead your mind to sleep.
If I were the President of this land,
You know I would declare total war on the pusher man. .... 19D
A record company recently distributed "Snowblind Friend"200 with an
accompanying notice which announced in huge capital letters: "SNOW
IS COCAINE/'SNOW BLIND FRIEND' IS AN ANTI-DRUG SONG THAT PUTS
ONE OF TODAY'S MAJOR PROBLEMS INTO PERSPECTIVE . ... ,201 The
song recounts the agonizing tale of a drug addict found lying on a side-
walk. He has spent his only money in purchasing cocaine. He is blind
and he is dying. Following the lyrics, the circular continues, "WE SIN-
CERELY HOPE YOU PLAY IT." Influenced by Notice 71-205, several
licensees decided against airing the record because of the drug ref-
erences. 20 2  This is not a unique instance and other anti-drug songs
confront censorship for the same or similar reasons.20 3
Mindful of the general imbroglio created by the Notice's ambiguities,
the FCC acknowledged that elucidation of 71-205 was imperative. Re-
sponding to various petitions,204 the Commission drafted Memorandum
Opinion and Order 71-428.205 Unfortunately, the document only
clouds the issues further. Order 71-428 "adheres fully" to the descriptive
policy embodied in the initial Notice, while purporting to clarify the
cryptic references to the burdensome operational duties. The Order
199. "The Pusher" by Hoyt Axton, copyright 1969, Lady Jane Music-BMI.
200. Hoyt Axton, copyright 1968, Lady Jane Music-BMI.
201. Id.
202. Affidavit of Douglas Wachholz, in Yale, supra note 83, at 18-19, lists several
licensees which eliminated the song from playlists due to the FCC's Notice.
203. See text accompanying notes 136-41 supra. See note 141 supra for a reference
to non-drug interpretations of Beatle lyrics and suggested anti-drug Beatle attitudes.
204. See F.C.C. Memorandum Opinion and Order 71-428, 31 F.C.C.2d 377 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Order 71-428]:
The Commission has before it petitions for reconsideration of [Notice 71-205]
... filed by the Federal Communications Bar Association; Pierson, Ball & Dowd
on behalf of Dick Broadcasting, Inc., Lee Enterprises, Inc., RKO General, Inc.,
and Time-Life Broadcast, Inc.; the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) . . .and Pacifica Foundation .... Id. at 377. (footnotes omitted).
205. Id. at 380, wherein the FCC declared:
[WMe are not calling for an extensive investigation of each such record. We recog-
nized in the ADL [Anti-Defamation League, see text accompanying notes 160-63,
supra] case .•. that imposition of any undue verification process "could sig-
nificantly inhibit the presentation of controversial issue programming"...
[W]hat is required is simply reasonable and good faith attention to the problem.
We would conclude this aspect as we did in [Notice 71-205]: "Thus, here as in
so many other areas, it is a question of responsible, good faith action by the public
trustee.... No more, but certainly no less is called for."
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states: "[W]e are not calling for an extensive investigation . ,,"206
However, what the Commission is calling for remains indiscernible.
Paragraph 4 of Order 71-428 says:
[N]othing in the prior Notice stated, directly or indirectly, that a li-
censee is barred from presenting a particular type of record. On the
contrary, the Notice made clear that selection of records was a matter
for the licensee's judgment.
20 7
However, paragraph 7 continues:
[T]he Commission concedes that it . . . did make clear in the Notice
that the broadcaster could jeopardize his license by failing to exercise
licensee responsibility in this area.
20 8
Within the confines of a single document, licensees are told that the
Commission cannot review lyrics but that the broadcaster risks loss
of his permit if he does not perform such review himself. As ques-
tioned by one protesting announcer, "Why must we do what the Com-
mission cannot?"209  Another obvious question is that if the privilege
to continue in the conduct of one's livelihood is at stake, how much
of the "licensee's judgment" is actually involved?
The Memorandum Opinion and Order has not proved to be an
explicative contribution. Station managers have stated that they are
still unclear as to their responsibilities and every bit as apprehensive
regarding the status of their licenses. 210  A post-memorandum sur-
vey affirms that the broadcasters fear the Commission to such a degree
that they will initiate any action to avoid its displeasure, even though
they are uncertain as to the nature of the requirements.211
Confronted with petitions filed by complaining licensees,212 the
206. Id.
207. Id. at 378.
208. Id. at 379.
209. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, Civil No. 71-1780 (D.D.C., filed May 17,
1971), Petition for Clarification and Reconsideration and Request for Declaratory
Ruling, Affidavit of J.H. Irwin at 1.
210. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, Civil No. 71-1780 (D.D.C., filed May 17,
1971), Petition for Clarification and Reconsideration and Request for Declaratory Rul-
ing, Affidavit of Douglas Wachholz at 2. All stations contacted feel that records must
be closely scrutinized, but many are uncertain as to what this entails. Some think
pre-screening is still required, while others believe that they may safely conduct a
review while a record is being played on the air. Many of the broadcasters feel that
the outcry from the industry and the questionable constitutional status of 71-205 forced
the FCC to attempt to "cover up" their intentions. Typical comments recited in the
Wachholz Exhibit revealed that the subsequent Memo was of little aid. Id.
211. Id. at 10.
212. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, Civil No. 71-1780 (D.D.C., filed May 17,
1972]
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FCC nevertheless declined in Order 71-803 to rule upon the ques-
tions presented. "We do not believe that any further extended dis-
cussion is warranted. . . . [W]e see no need to analyze it [71-428]
for alleged inconsistencies with [71-205]. . . -21' This Memorandum
is itself the subject of current litigation.214
The numerous episodes of overreaction and confusion after the FCC
action abundantly illustrate the urgency of the crisis existing amid the
petitions and memoranda. The Commission's innuendo pertaining to
license renewal wreaked an impact so concussive that apprehensive
broadcasters have exaggerated their compliance to grievous propor-
tions. The General Manager of a Maryland station ordered the
screening of the recorded library "with those tracks containing illegal
material obliterated to prevent accidental use. ' 15 A Massachusetts
newscaster, unconnected with musical broadcasts, was instructed to
"tone down" his commentaries and avoid controversial and radical
topics. He was later terminated from his position after bringing a
personal album to the studio,2 6 and the employee who subsequently
played the record (which had no drug lyrics of any sort) was among the
numbers dismissed from various stations.217 One station ultimately
notified employees of "an immediate ban on all music containing lyrics
even remotely dealing with politics, sex, and to a minor degree,
ecology. '218
1"1. CONCLUSION
The FCC has patently overstepped valid constitutional restraints in
its promulgation of Notice 71-205. In framing the two classes of
songs which "depict the dangers of drug abuse" and those which "to the
contrary, promote such illegal drug usage,"21 9 the FCC has fallen em-
barrassingly short of demonstrating that the latter "is directed to in-
1971), Petition for Clarification and Reconsideration and Request for Declaratory
Ruling.
213. F.C.C. Memorandum Opinion and Order 71-803, 31 F.C.C.2d 385 (1971).
214. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, Civil No. 71-1780 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 28,
1971), Petition for Review of FCC, Sept. 28, 1971.
215. Affidavit of W. Goodhart, formerly of WHFS-FM, Bethesda, Md., in Yale,
supra note 83, at 2.
216. Affidavit of Kenneth F. Currier, formerly of WNTN, Newton, Massachusetts,
in Yale, supra note 83, at 1-2.
217. Affidavit of Steve Leon, in Yale, supra note 83, at 4; Affidavit of John Gorman,
in Yale, supra note 83, at 2.
218. Affidavit of John Gorman, in Yale, supra note 83, at 2.
219. Notice 71-205, supra note 21, at 2.
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citing or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action."2  Moreover, 71-205 violates the Com-
munication Act's prohibition of censorship, both as defined by the Su-
preme Court22' and by Congress.2 22 Even if drug lyrics are properly the
subject of regulation, the Public Notice and succeeding endeavors at ex-
planation are nevertheless unconstitutionally vague since it is patent that
professional broadcasters must necessarily guess at their meaning and
differ as to their application. 223  The chilling effect upon protected
speech is manifested through widespread overreaction.
In dissenting to 71-803, Commissioner Nicholas Johnson suggested
that the majority should "swallow its pride and admit a mistake".22 4
But after one Notice, one attempt to explain it, and a final refusal to
discuss the issues further, it is apparent that the disentangling of these
problems will only be achieved in the courtroom.
TOM WHEELER*
220. See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra.
221. See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
222. See text accompanying notes 92-99 supra.
223. See text accompanying notes 192-211 supra.
224. 31 F.C.C.2d 385, 386 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
* The writer is deeply appreciative of the efforts of Tracy A. Westen from the
Stem Community Law Firm in Washington, D.C. His contribution of the Yale briefs
and affidavits proved invaluable in the preparation of this Comment.
1972]
